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Economic- and Non-Economic Goals of Family Firms
Markus Probst
Otto Beisheim School of Management
Abstract
Motivated by a lack in the current literature, this thesis reviews academic research on the economic and noneconomic goals
of family firms. Heretofore, no detailed overview of different goals embedded in the goal setting-, outcome-, and alignment
process has been provided. Using a systematic literature search and review process, I identify 117 relevant studies in the
fields of management, economics, and affiliated domains between 1963 and 2018. Beyond a more detailed overview of the
current state of research, I outline goal setting, outcomes, alignment, and four different family firm goal classes. Lastly, I show
avenues for future research in the family firm–goal field.
Keywords: Family firms, economic goals, non-economic goals, socioemotional wealth
1. Introduction
1.1. Problem and Relevance
Traditionally, family firms despite being one of the most
essential forms of businesses have been viewed with incom-
prehension as they seemed to defy what classic management
theory asserts. Indeed, family firms often do not act in ac-
cordance with the iron logic of profit maximization, pure
shareholder focus, or mere fulfillment of annual financial
statements. They instead follow more inclusive approaches
encompassing firm-external stakeholders and the extended
family pursuing widely varying goals (e.g., Gómez-Mejía
et al., 2007). In particular, in the field of firm goals, the
pursuit of profit maximization seems to be less imperative
in family firms. Existing research either provides observa-
tions of how family firms behave differently in this regard
or conceptual roots grasping at part of what comprises the
goal process. A detailed overview of the entire process from
the first individual’s thought to the ultimate outcome of the
pursued goals is, yet, to be published.
However, understanding, why families and their firms act
the way they do, can be a crucial insight for not only for
the owner families themselves but also the number of in-
teracting parties. Particularly in today’s world–a merry-go-
round of volatility, ambiguity, complexity, and uncertainty
(e.g., Bennett and Lemoine, 2014)–the right decisions have
to be made fast, and decision points arise more often than be-
fore. Nonetheless, decision-making is only the consequence
of the goal process that needs to proceed first, with the goal
outcome being the basis that affects decision-making. This
supremely concerns family firms since they as mostly private
businesses have no stock market to appease, fewer regula-
tions to comply with, and thus, in general, a higher degree of
freedom. Adding to that, forfeiture of the firm is more painful
to the owning families as the firm is the concentration point
of mostly undiversified family wealth, a source of employ-
ment, as well as the basis for a sense of self-perception and
identity (e.g., Aparicio et al., 2017; Shepherd et al., 2009).
Furthermore, standing in a long, multigenerational tradition
often leads to inertia as some family firms to only continue
what has been done for the past decades. All of the afore-
mentioned factors make family firms prone to the augmented
difficulty of decision making. Notwithstanding, the negative
consequences of potential firm loss are not solely limited to
the sphere of family firms and their researchers but to the
whole economy as family firms constitute the backbone of
many economies due to their high number and them being
a paradigm of embeddedness into local communities (Astra-
chan and Shanker, 2003).
1.2. Objective
The goal of this thesis is to consolidate existing literature
on the goal process in family firms describing what goals ex-
ist, how goals are set, and what the outcome is by reviewing
the existing literature. Direct inputs are derived by collating
findings across academic literature from the domains of man-
agement, economics, and affiliated fields such as psychology
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or sociology. As a result, the central research questions to be
answered are the following:
• Which processes do family firms use to set their orga-
nizational goals?
• How can the goals of family firms be systematically
clustered?
• What is the outcome of the goals for both, the firm and
the family?
After having presented my methodological approach and
an overview over the investigated studies, I will portray how
academic literature depicts family firms in setting their goals.
Thereafter, emphasis is laid upon common goals that will be
described and set into context in order to, first and foremost,
provide a taxonomy of what drives family firms, in particular
in comparison to their non-family counterparts, and demon-
strate the high goal diversity many family firms and their
members face. Following, the outcomes of the aforemen-
tioned organizational goals are depicted, and the process of
goal feedback and alignment is delineated. Lastly, I will dis-
cuss the findings with regards to avenues for future research,
limitations, and the practical implications, before concluding
this thesis.
Nonetheless, the aim of this thesis is not to look in the log-
ically subsequent decision-making process, which is based on
the goal outcomes, since this would surpass the scope of this
thesis. Ultimately, this thesis strives to, addressing both re-
searchers and practitioners, fulfill two main goals: (1) Give
an overview over existing literature with respect to family
firm and organizational theory, and (2) place itself in the
context of existing literature and outline avenues for future
research as well as practical implications.
2. Methodology
To identify relevant research on family firms as well as
their economic and non-economic goals, I follow the multi-
step process for systematic reviews as suggested by Tranfield
et al. (2003) and applied in this form by a multitude of man-
agement researchers (David and Han, 2004). Based on repli-
cable and systematic processes, systematic reviews are there-
fore considered an appropriate method for, first, identifying
and, later, evaluating research articles (Mulrow, 1994).
As the first step, a bibliographic database search in EB-
SCO Discovery Services (EDS) as the primary data platform
providing major coverage of multiple research fields was
conducted. The initial focus was laid upon English, peer-
reviewed academic journal articles, published between 1963
until March 2018. In order to identify relevant studies, I
searched for a combination of family firm and goal specific
terms in the title or abstract. I used the following keywords:
Family firm" OR "family business" OR "fam-
ily compan*" OR "family enterprise" OR "fam-
ily manag*" OR "family-control*" OR "family-
owne*" OR "founding family" OR "privately held"
OR "family influence*" OR "family govern*" OR
"family-led*" AND "emotion*" OR "goal*" OR
"value*" OR "worth" OR "social capital" OR "*fi-
nancial" OR "*economic" OR "wealth" OR "en-
dow*"
Secondly, due to the vast amount of search results1, I fur-
ther limited the results by focusing only on A* to A ranked
journals, with the exception of A* to C for journals specif-
ically dealing with family firms as this focus might impair
their ranking. For all rankings, I referred to the VHB ranking
when applicable.
Next, I assessed the relevance of the identified articles by
scrutinizing their abstracts. In this step, I eliminated 1,284
articles. Those articles did not focus on family firms or ad-
dressed other goal-related topics such as CSR without pro-
viding relevant insights into the goal process. I read the re-
maining articles in detail. This resulted in 55 articles that I
identified as relevant for understanding family firms as well
as their economic and non-economic goals.
Additionally, I complemented this approach by another
search for working papers and dissertations in EBSCO, which,
however, resulted in no relevant manuscripts. I also used
Google Scholar and identified 15 additional, relevant arti-
cles that I added to this work. To further reduce the risk of
missing out on important pieces of academic literature I ap-
plied the ancestry approach (Cooper, 1982). In this step, I
applied a backward reference search to identify and examine
the references cited in the selected publications from EBSCO
and Google Scholar. The ancestry approach also allowed me
to identify and include further studies on my subject of inter-
est resulting in 48 additional publications. In total, I hence
ended up with 102 studies on family firms, their goals, and
adjoining fields.
3. General Characteristics of Investigated Papers
The selection process resulted in a sample of 102 articles,
working papers, and other pieces of literature between 1963
and 2018. Prior to 2000, only 30 studies were published, and
half of the studies were not published before 2008.
Specifically, Cyert et al. (1963) in their first version from
1963 were the first to publish, and thereby, laying a theoreti-
cal foundation. They analyzed and described the interaction
of organizational members in the formation of coalitions
as well as bargaining and stabilization behavior resulting
in the emergence of organizational goals. Thirteen years
later, Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed the agency the-
ory addressing the problems of the division of management
and ownership. Also, building upon the prospect theory
as introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Wiseman
and Gomez-Mejia (1998) present the behavioral agency the-
ory which incorporates elements of behavioral, agency, and
prospect theory. Together with the stewardship theory that
1This EDS search yielded 8507 results.
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Figure 1: Methodological Approach; Source: own illustration
states managers if left uncontrolled will behave responsi-
bly as firstly introduced by Davis et al. (1997), this forged
an amalgam upon which modern family firm research was
founded. Another crucial theory is the stakeholder theory
as proposed by Freeman (1984) which assigns importance
to different groups within the firm. Nevertheless, another
aspect crucial for organizational goals of family firms, so-
cioemotional wealth (SEW), was not developed into theory
before Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007), despite being observed
beforehand. SEW is the affective endowment of the emo-
tions towards the firm but will be explained in more detail
later. Since then, multiple advancements to the issue have
been made and described in literature, such as numerous
scales and measuring attempts. Overall, the rapidly growing
number of publications from 2008 until now–accounting for
more than 50% of the identified studies–attests a burgeoning
interest in this field.
In addition, noteworthy sample characteristics are pre-
sented in the following: My analysis includes 109 academic
journal articles (published in 39 different journals), seven
book excerpts, and one unpublished working paper. Among
the academic journals, Entrepreneurship: Theory and Prac-
tice published 19% of the articles, followed by Family Busi-
ness Review with 12%, and Academy of Management Jour-
nal with 8%. Moreover, quantitative and conceptual ap-
proaches were applied in almost equal shares, with 44%
and 40% respectively. Qualitative studies and mixed-method
approaches follow with both 8%. The sample size in the in-
vestigated studies varies widely, ranging from country-wide
investigations of more than 700,000 firms to single case stud-
ies. Nevertheless, this number has to be treated with caution.
Excluding mass sampled studies with a six-digit number of
anonymous firm observations, e.g., Wilson et al. (2013), the
average sample consists of approximately 695 observations.
With regard to theories presented within the articles, so-
cioemotional wealth (SEW), followed by agency theory and
stewardship theory, are the dominant theoretical approaches
in most of the studies. My review further indicates that 54%
of the studies were conducted in the United States based on
local data, 10% based on German data and 7% on Canadian,
followed by Spain (4%), and the United Kingdom (4%). I
could only sparsely find any research on Asian, African, or
South American cases or samples, with each of the continents
only providing one study respectively. Further analysis of the
articles yielded that only 6% of the studies include data of
multiple countries, while the remaining 94% include data of
one country only.
In Appendix A, several illustrations of additional informa-
tion and descriptive statistics can be found:
• Figure 1 provides an overview of the studied literature
clustered by content and theory.
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• Table 2 exhibits the different methodologies applied in
the studies.
• Table 3 portrays the geographical spread of the quan-
titative studies over different countries sorted by re-
gions.
• Table 4 delineates the most cited researchers, including
co-authorships.
• Figure 8 illustrates an overview of publication years.
4. Current Status of Research
4.1. Key Definitions
4.1.1. Family firms
Family firms are prevailing institutions in the global econ-
omy (Astrachan and Shanker, 2003; Morck and Yeung, 2004;
Panunzi et al., 2002; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). The German in-
dustrial landscape is particularly influenced by family firms;
a recent estimation classifies almost 95% of German busi-
nesses as family firms (Kay and Suprinovicˇ, 2013). Never-
theless, academia is in disagreement about the very defini-
tion of a family firm and what constitutes one. The list of
commonly cited attributes includes continuity with respect
to transgenerational control (Zellweger et al., 2012) and the
overlap between the firm and the family system (Tagiuri and
Davis, 1992; Weigel and Ballard-Reisch, 1997) thereby in-
creasing complexity in conceptualization.
4.1.2. Socioemotional wealth (SEW)
What is inherent to most family firms (Berrone et al.,
2012) and vital in context of this thesis, is the concept of
Socioemotional Wealth (SEW), which aims to explain why
families and their members do not follow purely economic
criteria but other ones (Chua et al., 2015; Gómez-Mejía et al.,
2007). Instead, there is a range of emotions triggered by
the individual relationships of the respective family mem-
bers among themselves, with the firm, and other stakehold-
ers, summed up as affective endowment (Chrisman and Pa-
tel, 2012) that influences the goal and decision-making pro-
cess (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). This effect is particularly
observable in small firms where relationships are more per-
sonal, and thus, it is of high importance in the field of family
firm research (Berrone et al., 2012). The theory is mostly
used in analyzing strategic decisions in family firms (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2011) and adjacent arrays, such as goal setting.
A measure often used for the prevalence of Socioemotional
Wealth is family involvement (Chrisman et al., 2012), which
can be approximated with the equity stakes family members
hold (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Re-
searchers have introduced multiple, partially congruent mod-
els of SEW (e.g., Berrone et al., 2012; Debicki et al., 2016;
Hauck et al., 2016; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2014), which
will be introduced in the subsequent chapters.
4.1.3. Organizational goals
Understanding what constitutes an organizational goal is
also a prerequisite for this thesis. Research defines them as
“desired organizational outcomes that can be used to guide
action and appraise organizational performance [. . . ] but
distinct from measurable targets.” (Kotlar and De Massis,
2013, p. 3)
4.1.4. Goal Setting
Regarding the approach of setting organizational goals,
Cyert et al. (1963) have argued in their theory-setting work
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm that only individuals possess
goals and collectives do not by design. Following this view,
the organization consists of coalitions (if broken down fur-
ther called subcoalitions), which in turn consist of individu-
als pursuing their own yet similar goals (Cyert et al., 1963, p.
31). These coalitions are likely to include as many organiza-
tional members as possible in order to maximize bargaining
power and the desired outcomes for their members. As they
do not exist by design, organizational goals are usually set
in a complex process among all or most individuals involved.
At first, coalitions are formed out of organizational members,
and they bargain their individual goals to derive organiza-
tional goals using side payments in the form of money, au-
thority, policies, among others. Second, the previously bar-
gained goals are stabilized, i.e., they are fixated, and formu-
lated in the organizational systems controlling the member
actions, such as budgets. Later, organizational goals are in
constant need of updates on progress so far and alignments
within the coalition (Cyert et al., 1963, p. 33). For family
firms, this the family constitutes one of the most important, if
not the most important coalition, which is likely to also have
specific family-influenced goals (Klein et al., 2005), hence
goal clustering differs.
The usually applied dichotomy between financial and
nonfinancial goals with regards to the content of the goal
(Chrisman and Carroll, 1984; Venkatraman and Ramanu-
jam, 1986), has been adapted in family firm research to
economic and noneconomic goals. They encompass contents
exceeding the mere financial in order to cover aspects such
as growth (Kotlar and De Massis, 2013). The second dimen-
sion is internal and external goals depicting the direction
in which the goal aims (cf. Cyert et al., 1963; Kotlar et al.,
2018). For family firm research, scholars have adapted these
dimensions to family-centered and nonfamily-centered goals
(Kotlar and De Massis, 2013). The resulting goal categories
as seen in Figure 3 will be subject in chapter 4.3 to 4.6.
Although this selection claims to be mutually exclusive and
comprehensively exhaustive, not all organizational goals can
be assigned to a single class without a doubt. It may happen
that a specific goal is subject to two or more classes (Miller
and Le Breton-Miller, 2014), e.g., appointing a family mem-
ber to the board of directors can increase family control over
the firm (Family-Centered Economic goal), family identity
(Family-Centered Noneconomic goal), as well as the fam-
ily’s external relations (Nonfamily-Centered Noneconomic
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goal). Moreover, many goals are interrelated, have counter-
influences on each other, or manifest in both dimensions, the
family- and the nonfamily-centered dimension.
This results in a greater goal diversity within the firm
(Chrisman et al., 2012). Therefore, alignment and media-
tion of these goals among the stakeholders involved are of
great importance. Floyd and Wooldridge (1992) imply that
if more organizational members, e.g., lower management,
are involved and pursue a common strategy, the firm is more
likely to attain its goals. However, research has also shown
that goal alignment between family members is often low
(Villanueva and Sapienza, 2009). Therefore, above all for
family-centered goals, alignment is of utmost importance for
family firms (Chrisman et al., 2012). Kotlar and De Massis
(2013) identified two different types of alignment processes,
that is to say, the familial social interaction process and the
professional social interactions process. Both forms of inter-
actions as described by the researchers share that after a first
bargaining phase, stabilization must take place in order to
reduce goal diversity (cf. Cyert et al., 1963). Without any
stabilization, the effect of bargaining is negligible (Kotlar and
De Massis, 2013).
Professional social interactions only happen in the busi-
ness environment, e.g., management or board meetings, with
certain clearly defined roles, e.g., CEO or VP. In the bargain-
ing phase, rewards are promised, and threats are issued lay-
ing emphasis on mutual gains or losses, summed up admin-
istrative bargaining. Stabilization usually takes place in in-
stitutionalized forms, such as contracts, protocols, budgets,
or at least a gentlemen’s agreement, namely formal stabiliza-
tion. In contrast to that, familial social interactions occur in
both firm and family contexts, ranging from formal meetings
to dinner chats with less defined roles, e.g., founder and fa-
ther, director and son. They employ affective bargaining, i.e.,
the revocation of common values and shows of affect. The
outcome is sustained using social stabilization mechanisms,
such as moral codes or rituals, relying deeply on mutual trust.
The names of the mechanisms are not exclusive with regards
to the participating stakeholders.
With regards to further family firm-related theory adap-
tions, the behavioral theory was expanded by Fiegenbaum
et al. (1996) most notably with elements of the Prospect The-
ory as introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). This
yielded one major change with regards to family firms. The
reference point to which actions are taken (Kotlar et al.,
2014) is not of purely financial nature anymore but it is also
about the preservation of their stock of SEW (Berrone et al.,
2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), hence driving strategic de-
cisions (Chrisman and Patel, 2012).
The abovementioned behavioral agency model as pre-
sented by Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) only partially
explains the goal setting process. Focusing on the different
individuals that form a subcoalition, Mitchell et al., 1997
expanded the stakeholder theory as proposed by Freeman
(1984). The latter describes stakeholders as “any group or
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement
of the organization’s objectives” (p. 64), and this still holds
true for Mitchell et al. (1997). Stakeholders can influence
goals, actions, and decisions of the firm. The influence de-
pends on the respective stakeholder’s Legitimacy and Power,
as well as the Urgency of their claim to the firm (Pearce and
DeNisi, 1983). The legitimacy of family members, which Pa-
tel and Cooper (Patel and Cooper (2014), p. 1625) define as
“relative distribution of titles, compensation, and represen-
tation” is inherent to the family firm itself and strengthened
through personal and emotional bonds (Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2003). Power, as the individual’s ability to influence behav-
ior and events, is highly correlated with the equity stakes in
the firm (Finkelstein, 1992; Martin et al., 2013; Pfeffer and
Pfeffer, 1981). Lastly, urgency describes how immediate the
stakeholder’s required action is and steers attention (Mitchell
et al., 1997) but is purely driven by the situation and environ-
ment. However, stakeholder theory hereby merely explains
the behavior within and among coalitions better. Following
Mitchell et al. (1997), the family is a stakeholder with high le-
gitimacy and power, whereas non-family management is usu-
ally characterized by high legitimacy but lower power than
the family. Yet, with family as management they do not nec-
essarily act as a coalition (cf. Cyert et al., 1963; Pitcher and
Smith, 2001). Chua et al. (2009) imply that differences be-
tween family and non-family members, especially within the
top management team (TMT), are widely inherent. More-
over, recent research highlighted that the traditional view of
the family as a homogenous block does not hold true in prac-
tice. Many firm-owning families, particularly, if associated
with the firm for many generations, have broken into differ-
ent branches constituting their own subcoalitions (e.g. Zell-
weger and Kammerlander, 2015).
4.2. Family-Centered Economic Goals
The first class of organizational goals to be evaluated are
Family-Centered Economic Goals (FCE goals). They encom-
pass all economically relevant goals that are only directed
at the family and are usually targeted at “keeping company
control in the hands of the family and to generate various
forms of wealth for the family.” (Kotlar and De Massis, 2013,
p. 1272) Thus, standard financial goals such as economic
performance are classified as Nonfamily-Centered Economic
Goals (see chapter 4.5). Two of the most prominent exam-
ples include family control over the firm and family wealth
(Kotlar and De Massis, 2013; Tagiuri and Davis, 1992).
4.2.1. Family Control over the Firm
A key FCE goal for many family firms is control over the
firm sustained for generations (Zellweger et al., 2012). Fam-
ily control is also what many scholars define as a key pillar
constituting a family firm (Tagiuri and Davis, 1992). How-
ever, as the firm represents a major asset, it can be a point of
conflict within the family and with other stakeholders.2
2This review lists the organizational goals of family firms in their spe-
cific goal class in chapter 4.3 to 4.6. Although the numbering of the goal
described was done so intentionally in order to convey a structure, in par-
M. Probst / Junior Management Science 3(4) (2018) 30-47 35
Figure 2: Overview of Goal Classification; Source: own illustration based on Aparicio et al. (2017), Kotlar and De Massis
(2013)
Furthermore, control over the firm is also a prerequisite
for the existence of SEW (Zellweger et al., 2012) since it is
not possible to consume the non-financial benefits that are
part of the SEW (Debicki et al., 2016) without a minimum
level of control. Hence, the intention to sustain family con-
trol over the firm for the generations to come, also called
transgenerational control intention (TGCI), is seen as com-
plementary to SEW (Zellweger et al., 2012), which is also
likely to rise over time with the self-attribution (Belk, 1988;
Zellweger et al., 2012). Other studies directly attribute con-
trol by the family with its emotional bond to the firm, and
therefore, SEW (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). Different mod-
els of SEW aim to capture this relationship. Berrone et al.
(2012)’s FIBER model yields two dimensions that coincide
with the goal of family control; Family Control and Influence
as well as Renewal of Family Bonds to Firm Through Dynas-
tic Succession. The former links SEW to organizational struc-
tures through which family members exert control over the
firm. Families can exercise control by directly taking roles in
the TMT, such as CEO or chairperson (Berrone et al., 2012;
Zellweger et al., 2012). Likewise, families influence the firm
indirectly. Appointing the TMT is most effective as an indi-
rect influence (Berrone et al., 2012). Yet, other means such
as communication with management (Kotlar and De Massis,
2013) or shaping values and a mission for the firm (Habber-
shon et al., 2003) are also applied to ensure that the firm
follows the family’s goals. The other dimension of SEW as
described by Berrone et al. (2012) impacting the FCE goal of
family control is the renewal of family bonds to firm through
dynastic succession. With the firm being central to the fam-
ily’s identity (see chapter 4.4), family members regard to the
firm as a long-term investment that is intended to be passed
on to future generations (Berrone et al., 2010). Another com-
monly cited model is Debicki et al. (2016)’s SEW importance
ticular cases, it can also serve as a hierarchy. However, the heterogeneity of
family firm makes providing a universal hierarchy impossible and the struc-
ture should be seen with caution. The specific goal classes are not put into
hierarchy but ordered according to the aforementioned matrix as there is
even more variation between different family firms.
scale. Here the item of Family Continuity concurs with family
control as a goal. It captures similar elements as the model
by Berrone et al. (2012) but lies additional focus on the in-
dividual family member’s intrinsic motivation regarding firm
control.
However, this bears certain implications, in particular
when dealing with outside investors. Following Carney
(2005), increased ownership and control manifested through
guaranteed property rights foster particularistic behavior and
deviations from traditional management theory. Le Breton-
Miller et al. (2011) imply that family involvement, i.e., in the
form of control, acts as a major signal to outside investors
that preserving SEW is a priority of the firm. Consequently,
the family needs to create a level of legitimacy sufficient
for outside investors. To that end, family firms need to in-
vest more effort into conforming with other strategic norms
(Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011). If they do not invest, they are
at risk of lowering financial performance at the expense of
sustained control (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). A commonly
cited study in this array is Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) which
reviewed in a large-scale study that family-run olive oil mills
are significantly less likely to join a cooperative3, which is
financially beneficial but represents a loss of family control.
Furthermore, family control intentions can be a particular
source of conflict in cases where the family is not the only
shareholder. Specifically, when minority investors are in-
volved, this yields a source of agency conflicts (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Therefore, the
question if family control is sustained is not the most im-
portant question to answer. One should rather focus on
how it sustained in order to not lose the needed minority
shareholders.
Thus, family control over the firm thus denotes an im-
portant organizational goal since it is essential for the status
as a family firm and is prerequisite for multiple other orga-
nizational goals. Hence, family firms that do not strive for
3A cooperative as described by Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) is an associa-
tion of persons that pursue common (financial) goals by jointly controlling
and owning the enterprise.
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a minimum level of control over the firm are not likely to
remain as such.
4.2.2. Family Wealth
Family wealth as an FCE goal refers to the family’s (busi-
ness) assets. As for almost every other person, the individual
wealth is of foremost importance. The firm itself usually com-
prises the basis of the family’s wealth and especially in well-
established family firms, there are many family members that
lay claim to the resulting wealth (Zellweger and Kammerlan-
der, 2015). However, as wealth is tied to the firm, it is more
difficult to separate and distribute it, hence, further conflict
potential is generated.
Astrachan and Jaskiewicz (2008) calculate the total firm
value as the sum of the financial value and the emotional
value (see Appendix B). The financial value can be deter-
mined using traditional financial valuation plus the sum of
private benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Private bene-
fits can include a large array of financial advantages arising
from exerting control over a firm and include acts such as
selling assets under fair value to related groups or consum-
ing certain perks on the firm’s expense (Nenova, 2003). Con-
trol over the firm is a prerequisite for private benefits (Gross-
man and Hart, 1988), therefore, in the case of family firms,
this concerns the family only. Nevertheless, different family
members may have different access to the benefits and thus
the level of extraction differs (Zellweger and Kammerlander,
2015).
To mitigate the risk of conflicts over family wealth, a myr-
iad of governance mechanism has been developed. Especially
in the case of older, well-established family firms, wealth has
often been accumulated over generations, and hence, has
been reinvested. As money has multiplied, so has the family,
too. The many family members are prone to argue about the
fair distribution, allocation and investment of money (Chris-
man et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Kellermanns and
Eddleston, 2004). A commonly used solution is the separa-
tion of the family and its assets (Zellweger and Kammerlan-
der, 2015). Following that, there are different levels of sepa-
ration ranging from no separation over medium form (family
office) to complete separation (family trust) as described by
Zellweger and Kammerlander (2015). This has implications
on how individualistic family wealth as a goal is pursued. In
the case of high separation, the potential for conflicts among
family members is reduced as every member can have his or
her share invested according to the own risk preference and
is more easily accessible.
Recapitulating, the mere generation of family wealth is
unquestionably a goal for almost the entirety of family firms,
yet, the distribution and management of family wealth poses
a much greater challenge. If this challenge is not overcome,
the family, and consequently, the firm can be seriously im-
paired by the resulting conflict.
4.3. Family-Centered Noneconomic Goals
The class of Family-Centered Noneconomic Goals (FCNE
goals) covers all those organizational goals that are only di-
rected at the family but do not coincide with their economic
matters. Consequently, social and emotional goals are preva-
lent, including family identity, family harmony, and family so-
cial status which have described as the most prominent ones
by Kotlar and De Massis (2013). Furthermore, what Chris-
man et al. (2012) note is that family involvement, proxied
by family ownership share in the firm, is positively correlated
with the tendency to pursue FCNE goals, but the authors do
not elaborate on how this interrelation takes place specifi-
cally.
4.3.1. Family Identity
The self-perception of every family member can also be
a goal of family firms. It is particularly relevant to foster a
common sense of identity to preserve family harmony. Nev-
ertheless, problems for family identity lay in the concept of
how the family understands itself.
Family firm scholars have noted that the intertwined so-
cial systems combining family and firm (Tagiuri and Davis,
1992) contributes to a unique self-concept and identity for
both (Berrone et al., 2010; Dyer Jr and Whetten, 2006).
Consequently, family identity constitutes a source of SEW
for the family (Aparicio et al., 2017). Therefore, preserv-
ing the family identity equals preserving SEW (Gomez-Mejia
et al., 2010). Family identity as an FCNE goal is touched in
Berrone et al. (2012)’s FIBER dimensions of SEW as Fam-
ily Members’ Identification with the Firm and Emotional At-
tachment. Pivotal for the family members’ identification with
the firm is that it often carries the family’s name blurring the
lines between family and firm further and making the family
at least partially responsible for the firm’s behavior (Dyer Jr
and Whetten, 2006). This makes families see the firm as an
extension of themselves. Thus, firm reputation, as it will be
examined in chapter 4.6, is deeply interwoven with family so-
cial status and family identity. Moreover, transgenerational
aspects play a role in forming the family’s identity. The firm
is a symbol standing for the family’s tradition and heritage
passed through generations (Tagiuri and Davis, 1992). In
turn, the firm is seen as a vehicle for the continuation of the
family’s values (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), hence, adding to
the view of the interlinkage of the firm and the family iden-
tity (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2014). Another dimension of the
FIBER, emotional attachment, also contains the goal of fam-
ily identity. As mentioned above, it depicts how the family’s
emotions interact with the firm. The temporal aspect of how
the firm demonstrates family identity is also present in this
dimension. Berrone et al. (2012) quote Kleine et al. (1995)
in illustrating emotional attachment to the firm as a way to
ensure a family member’s self-continuity providing an anchor
for the past, desirably presented by fond memories, a reflec-
tion of the present, and an outlook into the future. Further-
more, emotional attachment gives the family legitimacy for
controlling the firm as the potential firm forfeiture foments
emotional stress (Shepherd et al., 2009).
Family identity is particularly salient in fostering family
harmony and ensuring prolonged commitment to the firm. If
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family identity is not strong or even fragmented, the family’s
efforts in the firm can be rendered futile.
4.3.2. Family Harmony
Harmony, from the Ancient Greek word for unity (Aρµνια),
as the prevention of conflicts and a general sense of unifi-
cation, is a goal many families strive for. For firm-owning
families, it is especially important to not impair the firm
by creating conflicts. Research shows a reciprocal relation-
ship between family harmony and the firm performance (cf.
Habbershon et al., 2003). Damage to one dimension will
eventually hurt the other one as well.
Research covers the goal of family harmony in various
models. Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2014) describe, in
particular, family harmony as connected to Restricted SEW,
meaning that the influence is limited to the family only.
Berrone et al. (2012) touch it in their SEW dimensions of
Binding Social Ties and Emotional Attachment. Binding
social ties relates to the family firm’s social relations, in par-
ticular with the family. In accordance to Cruz et al. (2012),
Berrone et al. (2012) illustrate the effect of the family’s kin-
ship ties on the enclosed members. After ties are formed,
SEW enriches them with mutual trust, commitment to the
firm, and feelings of closeness that result in collective social
capital, hence fostering SEW. If those ties are severed, SEW
is lost. Thus, the objective of family harmony aims at pre-
serving SEW. The other dimension, emotional attachment,
aims at capturing how emotions play a role in the context
of both, the family and the firm (Berrone et al., 2012). The
involvement of not only the family but also its emotions is
what scholars use as a criterion for defining a family firm
(Berrone et al., 2012; Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007;
Tagiuri and Davis, 1992). As the family and the firm system
often lack clearly defined borders, family emotions can enter
the firm and impact decisions and process (Baron, 2008).
Since emotions range from positive ones (e.g., love or hap-
piness) to negative ones (e.g., anger or hatred), their impact
is as manifold as the emotions themselves.
According to Schulze et al. (2003) and Schulze et al.
(2001), a common mechanism in family firms to ensure har-
mony based on mutual feelings of affect is altruism, i.e.,
“a trait that positively links the welfare of an individual to
the welfare of others.” (Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2004,
p. 215) Based on the mutual affect, family members be-
have more caring and considerate, thereby fostering commit-
ment and loyalty (Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2004; Schulze
et al., 2003). If a family member were not to act altruistically,
his or her utility would decrease. The negative consequences
of not acting altruistically outweigh the benefit of saved re-
sources. For this reason, acting altruistically also means act-
ing egoistically at the same time (Schulze et al., 2003). Still,
this consideration takes place inadvertently. Hence, altruism
enhances the existing bonds between family members by in-
creasing the affect component. In contrast to these positive
effects, altruism can hurt the firm’s performance by triggering
decisions that may be self-less, hence, preserving family har-
mony and SEW. Yet, these decisions may not be sound from
a purely financial perspective. Thereby, agency conflicts with
potential non-family management could be created (Jask-
iewicz and Klein, 2007; Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2004).
These agency conflicts can, in turn, impose further problems
on the firm. Following Schulze et al. (2003), also internal
problems can be triggered by altruism such as free-riding or
prolonged dependence on the family’s generosity. In fami-
lies with multiple family branches, altruism can also impair
family harmony if a particular family branch is favored over
another. In such a case, altruism increases family branch har-
mony but at the same time decreases overall family harmony.
Agency theory as well as families have been concerned with
this issue for a prolonged time and have found certain mitiga-
tion mechanism from the field of family governance (Schulze
et al., 2003).
Debicki et al. (2016) also cover family harmony and al-
truism as part of the Family Enrichment dimension of their
SEW importance scale. Additional focus is laid upon the feel-
ing of family obligation. This plays into the sense of altruism
as already outlined above. However, Debicki et al. (2016)
view altruism as particularly salient when it comes to employ-
ing family members as a member to enhance overall happi-
ness. Family harmony as a goal aims at keeping the relations
within the family intact. If harmony is not preserved, con-
flicts within the family and the firm can erupt.
4.3.3. Family Social Status
How the family is perceived by the community is concen-
trated in the family social status. The third FCNE goal to be
evaluated in this subchapter is family social status, i.e., how
to the family values its perception by the community. It is pri-
marily built from the family identity as well as how the firm
and its relations to the community is seen over time. Their so-
cial status is important for many families as it provides them
with certain feedback to their actions and rewards pact ef-
forts. However, research on family social status is scarce.
Social status is commonly derived from the family mak-
ing contributions to the community, either in the form of
money or non-financial inputs (Berrone et al., 2010). What is
most impactful is usually the employment of local community
members as this provides a considerable number with jobs
and secures their living. More prominent in people’s percep-
tions, however, is sponsoring of charities, associations, and
sports clubs, which therefore makes it an attractive activity
for family firms (Berrone et al., 2010). Especially for future
generations, family social status is important, and they wish
to consume the benefits emanating from it (Le Breton-Miller
et al., 2011). Also, family social status acts as a mediator for
family control’s influence on SEW. A high level of family con-
trol increases SEW only if the family is prestigious, i.e., family
social status is high because otherwise, the family does not
want to be associated with the firm.
Especially for family social status, individual goals of fam-
ily members are critical. Schulze et al. (2003) argue that
increased social status strengthens individual members’ ego
hence forming a collectivist individual goal. The family’s so-
cial status if perceived as resulting from engagement with the
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firm can foment further engagement. This implies, by argu-
mentum e contrario, that if the family social status is low,
engagement will be automatically lowered.
4.3.4. Further FCNE goals
Debicki et al. (2016) also list other FCNE goals taken from
research by Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007), Gomez-Mejia et al.
(2010), and Jones et al. (2008), which are partially congru-
ent with the ones mentioned above. Collating with Aparicio
et al. (2017), it yielded the following listing of further FCNE
goals:
• Preservation of the firm’s sentimental value to the fam-
ily and its members
• Fulfillment of obligations to the family that are based
on blood ties rather than on strict criteria of compe-
tence
• Perpetuation of entrepreneurial spirit and thereby fol-
lowing the founder’s vision for the firm
4.4. Nonfamily-Centered Economic Goals
The class of Nonfamily-Centered Economic Goals (NFCE
goals) encompasses all organizational goals that only relate
to economic aspects and are not specifically directed at the
family. They include aspects such as “disparate indicators of
economic performance such as growth, survival, and profit.”
(Kotlar and De Massis, 2013, p. 1273)
4.4.1. Firm Survival
The first and foremost goal of every firm is to keep run-
ning its business. This goal, of course, also applies to family
firms. In contrast to non-firm owning families, the firm is vi-
tal to firm-owning ones (Tagiuri and Davis, 1992). However,
families can be forced to intervene when the very firm sur-
vival is threatened, and they often need to invest their own
wealth to save it. Therefore, families have a profound inter-
est to keep the firm running in order to avoid this compulsion
to get actively involved.
Other researchers reviewed the survival of family firms
in comparison to non-family firms, however, with ambiguous
results (Wilson et al., 2013). Some distinct features of family
firms, such as SEW (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), continuous
efforts to preserve good relations (Berrone et al., 2010), and
multigenerational perspectives (Miller and Le Breton-Miller,
2003) are proposed to enhance the likeliness of family firm
survival. Nonetheless, other factors inherent to family firms
decrease their likeliness of survival. In contrast, family firms
are less likely to join a cooperative as a measure to decrease
performance risk, which increases the chance of firm survival
drastically but reduces SEW (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), and
they are less likely to diversify (Carney, 2005; Gomez-Mejia
et al., 2010).
Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2013) depict how family
firms enhance their probability of survival with apt board
compositions. In the founding phase, when the firm is most
vulnerable although the founder and his or her family are
most committed, resources are generally scarce. Hence,
the board is appointed in such a way that it can provide
needed resources, e.g., technological advice, legal counsel
(Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2013). In its post-founding
phase, the family firm has already established itself, and the
founder has handed the firm over to family successors or
at least intends to. Since the family has also grown, the
potential for intra-family conflicts and rivalry is elevated
(Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2004), so that the family vs.
non-family ratio in the board is increased to ensure a fair rep-
resentation of all family branches. Yet, non-family members
are included to provide access to the local community in or-
der to grow the business further (Le Breton-Miller and Miller,
2013). In its final stage, ownership is more dispersed among
different family branches, emotional attachment is reduced,
and the firm is often professionally managed. Here, the most
critical resource for the firm is still family harmony, which is
maintained by appointing respected family members to the
board (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2013). Chrisman et al.
(2013) have found governance, in general, to be pivotal for
firm survival.
Synoptically, the firm survival is an indelible goal of a
family firm. Without it, the whole family firm system ceases
to exist. Yet, family firms possess certain resources that can
enhance or lower their chances of survival, requiring them to
leverage their advantages.
4.4.2. Firm Growth
The growth of the firm as the pursuance and penetration
of new ventures, products or markets is a goal of almost all
firms. For family firms, sustained growth can ensure the long-
term success of the firm, hence, satisfying transgenerational
control intentions. Nevertheless, family-centered goals may
inhibit firm growth as resources are tied up elsewhere.
Traditionally, growth opportunities are clustered using
the matrix of Anderson and Reeb (2003) along the dimen-
sions of product and market newness (see Appendix B). The
resulting strategies are somewhat differently followed by
family firms. Especially diversification, as represented by
new products in new markets, is applied to a lesser extent by
family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). In general, family
firms do not tend to start a completely new line of products
but continuously innovate the existing portfolio (Chrisman
and Patel, 2012). This is due to the fact that identification
of family member’s with the firm rather extends with focus
on the products than the markets they serve (Berrone et al.,
2012). However, Aparicio et al. (2017) list neither goal very
high indicating a preference for other goals.
As another basis for firm growth, Kellermanns et al.
(2008) characterize the firm’s entrepreneurial spirit. The
more entrepreneurial a firm is, the more likely it is to pursue
new ventures, enter new markets, and improve its perfor-
mance, hence, increasing revenue. Conversely, a lack of
entrepreneurial spirit inhibits innovation, consequently lim-
iting long-term opportunities (Kellermanns and Eddleston,
2006). The firm’s founder is in a position to create this spirit,
M. Probst / Junior Management Science 3(4) (2018) 30-47 39
and it is likely to last long (Schein, 1983). The involvement
of more generations also provides more entrepreneurial op-
portunities that are seen vital for cross-general growth be-
cause of more diverse views and opinions (Eddleston and
Kellermanns, 2007). In support, empirical studies such as
Lee (2006) show that family firms show higher growth than
their non-family peers, which is attributed to family involve-
ment.
Firm growth is vital as it keeps the firm well and creates
further resources, hence, enabling the pursuance of many
other family firm goal. If the family firm is not growing over
a sustained period of time, it can endanger firm survival, and
thereupon, the family wealth, too.
4.4.3. Firm Economic Performance
The economic performance of a firm is rather short-term
oriented and usually stated in a set of financial and economic
figures or ratios, such as: EBITDA, sales, profit, ROA, cash
flows, and many more. For family firms, these numbers have
importance as they lay the basis for a sound business. Nev-
ertheless, it may be the case that due to resource constraint,
the goal of economic performance is in contradiction to other
goals.
Following, literature has so far presented some evidence
with regards to the importance of firm economic performance
as an organizational goal (Wagner et al., 2015). However,
theories on why family firms should be more profitable or less
profitable than their non-family counterparts are numerous.
Fama and Jensen (1983) have argued that the concentration
of ownership and control as present in family firms reduces
profitability as owners extract private benefits, many scholars
have focused on why family firms are likely to be less prof-
itable. Nevertheless, Wagner et al. (2015) demonstrated in
their meta-study that family firms tend to outperform their
non-family counterparts, especially in the case of publicly
listed firms and when abstracting from financing structure,
i.e. focus on metrics such as ROA instead of ROE.
In affirmation, Aparicio et al. (Aparicio et al. (2017), p.
166) list the item “meeting economic and financial ratios”
first in their ranking of family firm goals. The underlying rea-
son for that has already been introduced in chapter 4.3–the
firm’s economic performance has severe impacts on family
wealth (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) and therefore the fam-
ily’s overall living conditions. In times of financial hardship,
caused by lower firm performance, the family wealth is sig-
nificantly impacted by lower living standards (Miller et al.,
2008). Yet, several scholars showed in quantitative research
that family firms performed better than non-family firms. Us-
ing a sample of 511 U.S. corporations, Demsetz and Lehn
(1985) showed the superior economic performance of family
firms qualifying Fama and Jensen (1983)’s theory by adding
that the family can act as a governance mechanism safe-
guarding the firm from managerial opportunism. Anderson
and Reeb (2003) confirmed the outcome, however, warning
for a self-selection bias as families may exit non-performing
firms.
In the construct of NFCE goals, firm economic perfor-
mance takes the position of the most short-term oriented,
sometimes myopic goal. Albeit economic performance may
be ill some years, it is needed to ensure firm growth and firm
survival in the long run.
4.5. Nonfamily-Centered Noneconomic Goals
The last class of organizational goals of family firms to
be described within this academic research is Nonfamily-
Centered Noneconomic Goals (NFCNE). They include “im-
provement and conservation of good relationships with in-
ternal and external stakeholders, such as employees and the
external community.” (Kotlar and De Massis, 2013, p. 1273)
What most NFCNE goals have in common is that they are
the slightly contorted reflections of FCNE goals into the firm;
e.g., family social status to firm external relations, as how
the family or the firm is seen by outsiders, respectively. This
represents the relationship between Restricted SEW, i.e., the
FCNE goals, and Extended SEW, i.e., NFCNE goals, as de-
picted by Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2014). Restricted
SEW is solely focused on the family and creating benefits
for it, while Extended SEW takes a broader approach and
encompasses the creation of benefits also for non-family
stakeholders.
4.5.1. Firm Internal Relations
First and foremost, the goal of strong internal relations
focusses on the family firm’s employees and how the relation-
ship between family, firm, and employees is perceived. Based
on the family members’ identification with the firm (see chap-
ter 4.4), they see the firm as an extension of the family (Belk,
1988; Berrone et al., 2012). Therefore, internal resources,
such as employees, that constitute other aspects of the firm
are frequently included in this view (Huang et al., 2015).
Berrone et al. (2012) cover this within the dimension
Binding Social Ties in their SEW dimension model. While
foremost capturing the ties between the family members
themselves, following Miller et al. (2009), they argue that so-
cial ties are likely to be expanded to other, non-family stake-
holders, with employees being the most prominent ones.
This tie, however, is reciprocal since the family draws social
status of the employee’s affection. In turn, the employee’s
own social status builds upon with the family’s social status
and long-term commitment to the firm can increase the em-
ployee’s self-esteem and influence the way he or she views
him- or herself (Westhead et al., 2001). Anecdotal refer-
ences in research document close interactions of employees,
in particular, TMT, and the family blurring the lines as em-
ployees feel sentiments of emotional ownership of the firm
(Kotlar and De Massis, 2013). Miller and Le Breton-Miller
(2005) showed, using the examples of retailers Nordstrom4
4Nordstrom is a U.S.-American chain of department stores covering
clothing, shoes, and more fashion items, recently, also expanding into e-
commerce.
M. Probst / Junior Management Science 3(4) (2018) 30-4740
and L.L.Bean5, that if the feeling of belonging to the family
is shared by employees, their performance and long-term
commitment increases. In combination with the dimension
Family Members’ Identification with the Firm, Berrone et al.
(2012) outline that these ties can go beyond employees and
include the firm’s products and services as well as the inter-
nal processes. The identification is particularly salient if the
product or service contains the family name (Dyer Jr and
Whetten, 2006).
Hence, fostering a sound relation with the firm’s employ-
ees is another important goal of a family firm. Arising from
the identification with the firm, employees are also consid-
ered part of the family’s endowment. Consequently, if the
internal relations are ill, the family may suffer as their sense
of identity is compromised.
4.5.2. Firm External Relations
Under the goal of firm external relations, similar ties as
the ones mentioned above are captured. Family ties are not
necessarily limited to internal stakeholders only (Cennamo
et al., 2012) but family firms often also care about how the
firm is interconnected with outside stakeholders, such as cus-
tomers, suppliers, and others (Berrone et al., 2012; Micelotta
and Raynard, 2011). As external stakeholders also influence
how to the family is perceived (see paragraph on Family So-
cial Status), this is highly relevant for families.
Here, the description by Debicki et al. (2016) of the di-
mension of Family Prominence also comes into play. It em-
phasizes how others see the family and the firm. Particu-
lar items of their research included “[the] recognition of the
family in the domestic community for generous actions of the
firm” (Debicki et al., 2016, p. 52) demonstrating the inter-
relatedness of family social status and the firm external rela-
tions. Such relations are established in two-fold ways, that
is to say, by contributing to the community and by avoiding
to trigger the community’s concerns (Dyer Jr and Whetten,
2006). Then, again, the earlier these ties are established,
the stronger they are likely to be, as particularly the founder
leaves an imprint on the firm (Schein, 1983). Berrone et al.
(2010) confirm that engagement is elevated in firms with lo-
cal roots. For the family, these ties can act as an “insurance”
(Dyer Jr and Whetten, 2006, p. 791), since in times of cri-
sis the community might repay what the family and the firm
contributed (Debicki et al., 2016). Hence, building up and
fostering good external relations is partially done out of self-
interest, partially to satisfy goals of family identity and family
social status (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2014). The latter makes
engagement with the community more likely for family firms
(Berrone et al., 2010) as non-family firms do not pursue such
goals. On the other hand, the community is likely to accept
the contribution as it will be beneficial to it. Instances of hin-
drances of due to a poisonous community culture have been
described, which resulted in not only corrupted relations but
5L.L.Bean is U.S.-American chain of department stores specializing in out-
door equipment.
also economic downturn, see Banfield (1958) as presented
in Dyer Jr and Whetten (2006).
A common example of family firms engaging with the
community are corporate social responsibility (CSR) actions,
and family firms also demonstrate a higher level of commu-
nity citizenship (Berrone et al., 2010). A well-researched ex-
ample is family firms overfulfilling environmental standard
(Dou et al., 2017). Because academia presented evidence
both in favor of environmental compliance increasing finan-
cial performance and against (cf. Berrone et al., 2010), it
is not clear if the increased economic risk of going beyond
requirements will yield any return. Therefore, it is likely
that non-financial elements even out the risk-reward discrep-
ancy and motivate decision-makers to invest in environmen-
tal compliance. Rather do noneconomic motivates matter as
Westhead et al. (2001), as cited in Berrone et al. (2012) and
Dyer Jr and Whetten (2006), present evidence in support that
a public outrage against a firm carrying the family’s name can
be emotionally desolating for the respective family members.
Notwithstanding, Aparicio et al. (Aparicio et al. (2017), p.
166) list NFCNE items including “create and maintain ties
with local community” and “assume commitments to society
and the local networks” only midfield.
Firm external relations as a family firm organizational
goal constitute a logical fusion derived from the identifica-
tion process as described above, the goal of family social sta-
tus, and the unique resources non-family stakeholders can
contribute to the firm. Lacking good external relations, fam-
ily engagement is reduced, and also firm performance may
suffer.
4.6. Goal Outcomes
Family firm goals have an impact on various levels within
the organization with the two most important of them being
the family firm and the family itself. For each level, an array
of possible outcomes will be reviewed.
On the firm level, a vital relationship lies between the
involvement of family members in management and the
pursuance of family-centered goals, as described in chapter
4.3 and 4.4 since family-centered goals also tend to be less
tangible than nonfamily-centered goals. The more noneco-
nomic goals are pursued, the harder it is to measure their
attainment, hence reducing average executive compensa-
tion (Chua et al., 2009). For non-family managers, this
is less attractive as their compensation will most likely be
uncompetitive. Hence, the more noneconomic goals are
pursued, the less professional the management in terms of
non-family members will be (Chrisman et al., 2014). Ad-
ditionally, a strong focus on family-centered goals increases
the potential for conflicts between the family and non-family
managers, hence, does the pursuance of family-centered
goals also reduce the involvement of non-family managers
(Lutz and Schraml, 2011; Zellweger et al., 2012). On the
other hand, scholars have shown that the more non-family
managers serve in the firm, the less family-centered goals
are pursued (Achleitner et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2008).
Therefore, a reciprocal relationship can be assumed and is
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supported by academic literature. However, for the specific
family-centered goal of intra-family succession as part of sus-
tained family control, literature remains ambiguous. Smaller
family firms hire less non-family managers when an intra-
family succession is immanent. Conversely, the opposite
holds true for larger firms. Nevertheless, research has shown
that non-family employees can also be positively affected
in their motivation and performance by the achievement of
family-centered goals (Achleitner et al., 2010; Miller et al.,
2008).
Also agency theoretic considerations come into play. Less
goal diversity among all involved stakeholders reduces the
need for a board of directors, as Pieper et al. (2008), showed
since this implies stewardship behavior (Le Breton-Miller
et al., 2011). Also, board composition is affected. High goal
alignment favors not only small boards but also a lower ra-
tio between non-family and family members on the board
(Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007). On the contrary, Jaskiewicz
and Klein (2007) observed that large boards with many
non-family members could indicate an agency conflict be-
tween owner and managers. Thus, goal diversity defining
agency and stewardship behavior of stakeholders interacts
with the size and composition of the board as well as other
governance structures. Consequently, collective pursuance
of goals reduces agency conflicts and hence the need for
costly governance mechanisms (Davis et al., 1997).
As Chrisman et al. (2007) have shown that more align-
ment of family firm goals and hence reduced governance
cost increase firm performance. Miller and Le Breton-Miller
(2005) point out the superior performance of family firms
compared to their non-family peers. This holds especially
true if family ownership is high, hence connecting to the goal
of family control over the firm.
4.6.1. Family Level
On the family level, goal alignment is of utmost impor-
tance. Major findings of how the relationship among fam-
ily members is affected are based on how family interac-
tions within their firm, markedly how relationship conflicts
can negatively impact family firm performance (Eddleston
and Kellermanns, 2007; Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2004).
For no conflicts and thus high goal alignment, Lee and Ro-
goff (1996) noted that this could foster unification within
the family. Likewise, goal success fosters family harmony
(Philbrick and Fitzgerald, 2007).
Family members’ individual attitude is impacted by sev-
eral goal attributes, such as: (1) Goal difficulty, (2) goal nov-
elty, and (3) goal duration (Kotlar et al., 2018). If a goal is
achieved, family members feel more motivated and commit-
ted to the firm as well as perform better due to rewards in
monetary or affective form (Kotlar et al., 2018). This holds
especially true for difficult and novel goals, i.e., goals that
have low probability of success given the firm’s resources
and situation (Locke and Latham, 2002) and goals that re-
quire new capabilities (Sitkin et al., 2011), respectively, as in-
creased goal difficulty and novelty enhance the desire to per-
form in the best possible way, thus intensifying satisfaction
once the goal is achieved (Kotlar et al., 2018; O’Leary-Kelly
et al., 1994). The longer the goal duration, the lower the
performance and later motivation and commitment will be
since family members will reduce pace when driving the goal.
However, too tight deadlines increase pressure to an extent
where performance, motivation, and commitment will slack
(Locke and Latham, 2002), hence setting forth a u-shaped
relationship.
Although socioemotional wealth is also of high impor-
tance in the goal setting process (see chapter 4.2), it is also a
goal outcome. Literature differentiates goal outcome-related
SEW into SEW preservation and SEW generation (Williams Jr
et al., 2018). As illustrated by Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007),
SEW preservation as an ultimate goal and the reference point
(Berrone et al., 2010; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) drives
many decisions in the firm, often increasing the performance
risk, i.e., current performance is lower than past performance
or competitors’ performance. If SEW is preserved and even
enlarged, SEW generation takes place. Nonetheless, SEW
generation has not experienced much attention in literature
yet. However, other scholars outlined the potential for the
negative valence of SEW (Kellermanns et al., 2012; Miller
and Le Breton-Miller, 2014). In their research, they describe
cases in which both, family members felt pained and non-
family parties were mistreated. Younger generations may feel
pressured into taking over the firm hence only hesitantly ac-
cepting (Freudenberger et al., 1989; Schulze et al., 2001) or
different branches of the family may be fighting over the con-
trol over the firm (cf. Kellermanns et al., 2012). Moreover,
minority shareholders stake in the firm might have been ex-
propriated, or employees have been mistreated (cf. Kotlar
and De Massis, 2013; La Porta et al., 2000). Yet, from a SEW
perspective, acting in this way preserves SEW for the family.
Generally speaking, most family firm goals aim at preserv-
ing or even generating SEW, nevertheless, consequences can
differ (Chua et al., 2018).
The outcome of the family firm’s organizational goals
concerns firm and family. Each system has unique dimen-
sions into which the goals reverberate and later shape the
decision-making process in the firm. However, for each fam-
ily firm, a specific organizational goal leaves a unique imprint
in the respective dimensions. Figure 15 in Appendix B shows
this interplay graphically. Special focus is laid upon the fact
that the family firm’s organizational goals influence both, the
firm and the family system (cf. Tagiuri and Davis, 1992).
4.7. Goal Alignment
Organizational goals do not constitute a static process but
are subject to constant changes hence in need of feedback
and alignment processes (Kotlar et al., 2018; Williams Jr
et al., 2018). They require organizations to use alignment
processes for the formation and realization of goals as well
as changes in resource allocation based on the perception of
the goal outcome. Other research highlights the importance
of continuous evaluations of current performance against
past performance or the competitors’ ones (Iyer and Miller,
2008; Mishina et al., 2010). Therefore, most family firms
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also apply formal and/or informal feedback processes for
their organizational goals (cf. Kotlar and De Massis, 2013).
What deeply impacts goal feedback processes is the fact there
rarely is a sole goal that is pursued at a time only. Goals can
be independent of another, but are often interrelated, ei-
ther additive in effect, e.g., strengthened family identity and
community relations increase family reputation or rivaling,
e.g., economic performance might require a factory clos-
ing thus contradicting good community relations. For both
cases, but especially the latter, a goal hierarchy needs to be
established (Greve, 2008). Kotlar et al. (2018) illustrate this
feedback process as following either a sequential (Ethiraj
and Levinthal, 2009; Greve, 2008) or simultaneous atten-
tion rule (Labianca et al., 2009). The limiting feature of
sequential attention that forces organizations to give up on
one goal before pursuing another is what drives most organi-
zations to follow a simultaneous attention rule (Kotlar et al.,
2018). Also taking the decision which goal to pursue under
the sequential rule can spark disagreement because refer-
ence points and outcome utility may differ among decision
makers (Martin et al., 2013). For example, the family uses
the preservation of SEW as the reference point while non-
family investors follow primarily financial motives (Berrone
et al., 2012). For some goals this may not be a problem
withal as they are hierarchically-related with one another,
i.e., the first goal is a prerequisite for the next, higher goal,
e.g., good community relations for family social status, thus
repealing both attention rules (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2009;
Kotlar et al., 2018). Having reviewed 36 family firms, Apari-
cio et al. (2017) provide a potential hierarchy of goals. The
ranking does not confine to a single goal class but alternates
between. As the foremost goal, they describe the firm’s eco-
nomic performance or more specifically meeting financial
ratios, e.g., sales, profit. Second, the reviewed family firms
strive for handing over the firm in a good state to the next
generation. At the third and fourth place, they list retaining
family control over the firm and the board respectively. Nev-
ertheless, the heterogeneity of family firms does not allow
for a definite and rigid list (Aparicio et al., 2017).
In the following, three different feedback elements, com-
munication, conflict, and reputation, as in Williams Jr et al.
(2018), will be presented. A common understanding of the
specific organizational goal is the foremost prerequisite for
attainment. Without that commitment to the common goal,
it cannot be fostered hence reducing effectiveness (Anderson
and Reeb, 2003). For family firms, there are unique ways of
communicating within the family or with firm stakeholders.
As described in chapter 4.2, family firms can use professional
and familial social interactions in their goal process (Kotlar
and De Massis, 2013). Familial social interactions are un-
matched in the overlap of family and firm systems. Hence,
literature finds them to be particularly effective when deal-
ing with family-centered goals (Kotlar and De Massis, 2013).
Notwithstanding, communication is not limited to the family
only. Danes (2006) presents the advantage of open inter-
action including all stakeholders being a consistent perfor-
mance assessment of the goals incorporating possibilities of
beneficial changes. Consistent with Sharma et al. (1997),
the culture of the family firm can drive communication in
the goal process. In particular, paternalistic cultures that dis-
tinguishing themselves by high-power distance communica-
tion (Hofstede, 2001) is often impaired thus reducing the fre-
quency of feedback (Kelly et al., 2008).
Conflicts arise within the firm because the resources of
the firm and the family are limited, therefore they need to be
allocated efficiently, and goals need to be prioritized, which is
a frequent source of conflict (Achleitner et al., 2010; Lee and
Rogoff, 1996). From a behavioral perspective, conflicts arise
when organizational members feel a disparity in the per-
ceived utility of outcome, in the case of family firms, mostly
an imbalance between the prioritization of the firm and the
family’s member. Therefore, conflict can be considered as
a feedback to the family firm’s goals. Schulze et al. (2003)
note that conflicts are particularly frequent when succession
is immanent thus attributing to Kotlar and De Massis (2013)’s
observation that goal diversity is notably elevated during the
time of succession, circumstantially confirming the mediating
effect of conflicts in the goal process of family firms. After all,
if conflicts remain unresolved, they are, most likely, dimin-
ishing family member satisfaction and performance (Danes,
2006; Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; Kellermanns and
Eddleston, 2004).
Outside feedback also serves as an alignment function.
Particularly, family firms strive for a good reputation (Chen
et al., 2010), thus, functioning as a control mechanism and
goal at the same time. If SEW goals are perceived as posi-
tive by outside stakeholder, i.e., the community, non-family
managers, etc., this will enforce the fostering of SEW goals
and also enhances bonds between the family and the firm
(Zellweger et al., 2013).
Goal feedback constitutes an essential part of the over-
all goal process, which will be illustrated later. By using
communication, conflicts, or a mixture of both, there is con-
stant alignment throughout the whole goal process. Addi-
tionally, reputation serves as a feedback mechanism from out-
side stakeholders.
5. Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
This thesis is based on a systematic literature review
hence it is subject to all limitations of such a review. One
limitation is that only the content that was found can ul-
timately be reviewed. I tried to mitigate that risk by not
only using EBSCO Delivery Service but also the ancestry
approach (Cooper, 1982), nevertheless, a certain bias will
still existent. Since the field of the family firms and their
goals is still emerging and the key papers used are quite
recent, it could be likely that a relevant piece of literature
has not been identified and included. Moreover, this field
of research hitherto lacks a common terminology which in-
crease the difficulty of finding the right keywords for the
bibliographic database search. Hence, the ancestry approach
yielded many articles and papers, also because the topic of
organizational draws from many affiliated fields of research,
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this step is afflicted with a certain selection bias. Likewise, I
only focused on English, peer-reviewed journals, hence po-
tentially relevant findings published in non-English journals
or published elsewhere than academic journals have been
excluded. Moreover, the studies analyzed in the review lack
an international orientation and multi-country approach. As
previously outlined in the chapter on the characteristics of
the reviewed literature, most studies focus on Europe or the
U.S. and examine on a single country or part of it only. An
extension of the data pool might grant further insights, for
example regarding geographical and cultural differences.
This thesis contributes to the field of family firm research
but draws from a number of more or less affiliated fields
of research, such as psychology or sociology. When reason-
able, findings have been transferred, however, with caution.
In particular, purely conceptual work taken from there may
be based on certain assumptions, the field of family firm re-
search cannot fulfill. Nevertheless, empirical evidence is still
pending, and reality may prove some elements wrong.
Lastly, a certain limitation of this thesis is heterogeneity
of family firms. Whatever findings are presented, and con-
clusions are drawn, they may apply to some family firms to
a greater extent than to others. Aspects of culture, legisla-
tion, or general economic situation can severely impact the
goal process, thus impairing the results and findings. In light
of the almost exclusive focus on Europe and North Amer-
ica, which 93% of the investigated studies addressed, only
the Western culture area has been covered, hence arising the
need to investigate other culture areas. To that end, Stud-
ies focusing on Africa, Asia, and South America should also
have been investigated. Furthermore, the difference in firm
size and age of the samples included in the reviewed stud-
ies vary significantly, further contributing to the limitations
of this thesis.
Overall, the findings should be regarded to with caution
as the aforementioned factors may assume a certain underly-
ing bias and generalization of findings is also limited due to
family firm heterogeneity.
Although organizational goals of family firms have been
researched in the recent years, there still exist various re-
search avenues that should be followed in future research
in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of family
firms and their goals. Although the theory of the goal set-
ting process dates back to Cyert et al. (1963), it yet not fully
understood, especially with regards to family firms.
• Do family firms form coalitions differently?
• Are there mixed family/non-family subcoalitions and if
yes how do they act?
• Are professional and familial social interactions often
interrelated?
As another avenue for future research, organizational goals
of family firms should be further investigated. In particular,
many goals are overlapping and have been heretofore only
insufficiently defined. Additionally, empirical work is lacking
for many of them. Furthermore, goal outcomes have been
researched as in comparison to non-family firms. However,
as another avenue for future research, goal outcomes along
the dimensions presented before can help to elucidate the
goal process more clearly.
• How can goal outcomes be classified further?
• What are meaningful ways to investigate this array?
Next, the feedback process is a vital element for goal align-
ment. Nevertheless, so far little is known besides that more
communication increases chances of alignment and that con-
flict can be beneficial. Drawing upon work from the fields of
communication science and psychology, more specific ways
of communication and conflict as feedback processes should
be described. Also, how the influence of goal hierarchy and
the learnings drawn from the outcome is so far not fully un-
derstood. The former may change during the feedback pro-
cess, while the latter can difficult to quantify.
• Moreover, how do the firm’s culture and the intra-
family relations influence the feedback process?
Also, the interaction between the steps of the process would
benefit from further research. The process as such is unlikely
to run strictly linearly. When setting a goal, organizational do
have a certain goal and outcome in mind, hence, there is pre-
sumably a particular interplay. Nevertheless, it has hitherto
been insufficiently investigated.
• And if there is an interplay, how strong is it?
Another avenue for future research is understanding how the
context of firm and family impacts its goal and goal process.
As manifold as the context can be, the many-faceted the in-
fluence on the goals themselves and especially their outcome
will be.
• Which role do macro factors like legislation, technol-
ogy, and culture play?
• And which do micro factors, such as the education, eq-
uity stake, and personality of a certain organizational
member?
Ultimately, the relation of the goal process to the subsequent
decision-making process also needs further investigation. Al-
beit, research has shown that there is an interaction, yet, it is
to be fully understood.
• How does each goal outcome dimension influence the
decision-making process?
• Does the goal feedback process also affect decision-
making and if it does, to what extent?
6. Conclusion
Building upon a systematic review of 117 articles, in this
thesis, I depict the goal process of family firms. It differs
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from the goal process of non-family firms in various points.
First, when setting goals, family members are more influ-
ential and pursue more different individual goals than non-
family members. Later, bargaining can also take place on
an affective level and stabilization can be based on mutual
trust, in addition to the regular process as described by Cyert
et al. (1963). At this point, the conservation of Socioemo-
tional Wealth (SEW) is highly impactful as it constitutes the
reference point in regard to which decisions are taken.
From there, four distinct classes of family firm organiza-
tional goals emerge, differing in the dimensions of family-
/nonfamily-centered as well as economic/noneconomic.
This results in family-centered economic, family-centered
noneconomic, nonfamily-centered economic, and nonfamily-
centered noneconomic goals. Each goal class holds organi-
zational goals. Goals are often interrelated and affect each
other, thus, rather forming an alloy of goals that are pursued.
The goals reflect a certain outcome, which can be clus-
tered in to influence on the firm and on the family. Here, fu-
ture clustering is somewhat inconclusive and should be sub-
ject to further research as well as the alignment processes
that continue through the whole goal process.
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